Panel I--General Discussion by Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
PANEL ONE: GENERAL DISCUSSION
Mr. Sohn
Thank you very much for those remarks, because they show us
something very important. Congress is playing a crucial role in this
whole process and the negotiators for the United States dealing with
those problems should always remember that. I would suggest that
there seems to be agreement, at least in principle, that the purpose
of this round of negotiations, particularly with respect to services,
is progressive liberalization. The examples that were given indicate
that countries are liberalizing slightly; for instance, Canada which
has liberalized slightly its regulation of the insurance industry. Every
one of those steps might be small but they add up if you add them
for some hundred countries of the world that are involved. Such
liberalization always impacts favorably on somebody in the United
States, and that is why the importance is on doing it in the multilateral
fashion, because this way if you make a concession to one country,
that concession often means a concession to everybody on the subject.
The result is a liberalization all around. In the long run, Georgia in
particular benefits very much from liberalization abroad because the
British may have offered something, to the Polish Government, for
example, which Georgia also provides. There is liberalization through-
out because the negotiations have not only a reciprocal effect but a
multilateral one.
Mr. Kakabadse
We in the GATT Secretariat are particularly interested in the me-
chanics of these negotiations. There is a general willingness that was
clearly expressed at Montreal to reach a framework agreement and
to agree on a number of sectors for liberalization before the end of
the round if possible, but more probably afterwards.
How will this come about? What has to be done? This is a further
success of the statement made at Montreal by the Ministers, who
specified a detailed timetable for negotiations when they resume. Let
us assume that the service negotiations as in the other areas will
resume after the TNC meeting in April. What does this time table
consist of? First, the Ministers instructed the GATT Secretariat to
draw up a reference list of sectors that could help to limit the universe
of sectors for negotiation. Participants were invited before the summer
of this year to come up with what was called an indicative list of
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sectors, sectors that countries would either like to include in the
process of liberalization or perhaps exclude. Also, Ministers said the
rules and principles of a framework should be assembled in such a
way as to allow a draft to be completed by the end of the Round.
At the same time, and this is more ambitious, the concept will not
be agreed upon until a process of sectoral testing has taken place.
For example, how do concepts such as national treatment, non-
discrimination, most favored nation treatment or transparency apply
to various sectors? What are the implications of these concepts for
various sectors? This work will be taken up simultaneously when
these indicative lists are submitted, and all that will take place this
year. The mechanics of how this process will go ahead have to be
decided in the group negotiating on services. So far over the two
years, the group has been talking in general terms of what could be
the context of a framework agreement.
One of the problems is that because trade in services is different
from trade in goods, many of the familiar GATT concepts are not
really directly transferable from the latter context to the former, and
the services negotiations are technically outside the GATT. The serv-
ices negotiations are a separate group and are parallel to the group
on negotiations on goods, although GATT procedures apply to the
services negotiations, they take place in the same framework as the
Uruguay Round, and the group on negotiations and services also
reports to the body which carries out the negotiations, the Trade
Negotiations Committee ("TNC"). The point is that transferring or
translating a general willingness into the kind of provisions that are
going to be necessary to make a framework meaningful and to make
at least some sectoral liberalization take place requires a great deal
of work.
MrlI. Hunnicutt
Just a brief comment or response to several of the other speakers.
The discussions by Mr. Barfield, Congressman Jenkins and Professor
Sohn of the accretion of trade triggered issues of unilateral action
in my mind, particularly Mr. Barfield's discussion of 301 as opposed
to Congressman Jenkins's discussion. It is important to keep some
historical perspective. I am certainly not an advocate of unilateral
action in the trade field when it can be avoided and when we can
take actions in concert. But it is useful to remember that the first
dumping actions, or counterveiling duty actions, in particular, that
were taken were not taken under international agreements. They were
taken by countries protecting their tariff schedules. Eventually as
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these actions became a large enough distortion to international trade,
international agreements were reached as to how and when they could
be used. The same thing can happen in other areas such as services.
Unilateral actions are not necessarily pretty or nice, but they can
lead to international reactions that can allow multilateral agreements
to result which eventually allow fair, rule-of-law-oriented procedures
to govern the disagreements.
Mr. Barfield
I think we are playing a dangerous game. The way that the Super
301 is currently structured, it almost forces political leaders in other
countries to defy you if they have the strength, because it is very
difficult for an executive of a developing country to be perceived as
knuckling under to the United States. If we were to go against the
Brazilian President or if we keep beating on the Koreans you will
have a reaction. Rather fragile democratic processes exist in many
countries. You are already beginning to see that kind of reaction. It
is ultimately an irresponsible act on our part for reasons that I went
into before, because we are talking about what I consider not very
large issues in relation to ultimate reasons for trade flows. It is a
particularly irresponsible act on the part of the United States to do
what I think we are inevitably going to do because Ambassador Hills
considers herself in a trap. I would hope, and Mr. Jenkins has said
he read some of my pieces on the issue, that the Administration
would follow suggestions that the President use the great deal of
discretion granted him in Section 301. The President should now
announce publicly that he will use the Escape Clause at the end of
the negotiating process if it is in the United States' national interest,
and that he will not be bound by the timetable. Alternatively, he
could publish the entire list of trade barriers. We now currently
publish a piece of trash called Trade Estimates Barriers. It is a piece
of nonsense that purports to quantify the impact of individual trade
barriers. It is based on neither an economic nor a statistical foundation
and would not hold up in any reasonable court of law in which you
had to bring evidence. The President could, however, publish the
entire list and say, "Okay, here it is guys. You have asked me to
talk about trade barriers. However, I can not quantify it." The point
is that if you go through the process as you have it now, you put
other political leaders, particularly in developing countries, in a very
awkward position. It could not have come at a worse time as we go
into the most detailed discussions in the GATT Round where the
United States is supposedly leading a multinational negotiation. It is
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like saying, "Okay guys, these are my marbles and this is the way
we are going to play the game, or I'll take my marbles and go home."
Mr. Jenkins
I am in agreement with all the panel that the potential for a decrease
in the U.S. trade deficit would be very small as far as eliminating
in the short run what we perceive to be unfair trade barriers. Most
of the problem is in the field of macro-economics. Our deficit is a
problem which I acknowledge as the single most important problem
that the nation continues to face. Having said that, and also being
a member of the Budget Committee, and working under the con-
straints that there can be no increased revenues, and working under
the constraints that 300 billion dollars is as low as we can go in
defense spending if we are going to continue to defend the free world,
and that we can not cut any social security, which takes up another
280 billion dollars, there is little likelihood that we are going to do
better than meeting Gramm Rudman targets for the next four years.
If we meet those targets, our current account balance would probably
decrease by 50 to 60 billion dollars, and inflation along with interest
rates ought to decrease during that period of time. We shall continue
to work in that vein, but I am not so naive as to believe that we
are necessarily going to meet all of those targets.
The importance of the elimination of trade barriers, it appears to
me, is not whether or not it helps us temporarily by 10%, but that
it gives the opportunities for expanded trade and growth in the future,
rather than any temporary assistance. Therefore, any action including
the Super 301, which, incidentally, Congress does not look upon as
Super 301, but rather as their weak 301, that we can take without
destroying or permanently harming the world trade system, obviously
Congress would push in that direction.
Mr. Jonathan Aronson
This resembles the debates about arms control that centered around
brinkmanship. If the system does not work, then there is a giant
problem. It is like speeding through a series of red lights. You might
make it through any one of them, but the chances of successfully
traversing say ten busy intersections in a row without a major accident
is slim.
Congressman Jenkins and foreign countries face similar pressures.
Recently, I visited with a member of the Japanese Diet for a rural
district. He was talking positively about liberalizing Japanese trade
barriers when we were interrupted by a group of his constituents
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who happened to be cattlemen. My host asked me to excuse him for
a moment, turned to his constituents and started to lambast me,
promising to protect them from unfair U.S. demands to open the
Japanese beef market further. The farmers left happy; we went on
talking about freer trade.
What happens if Super 301 locks the United States in? If it forces
the United States to act precipitously, might it provoke a trade war
accidentally?
Mr. Jenkins
First, under the Super 301 action, you have so many outs that I
do not want to even count them all. You have three years of ne-
gotiations to try to get the barriers removed or reduced, and at the
end the President can say, "Well I just don't want to take any action
anyway, it's not in the best interest of the nation", and walk away
from it. From the Congressional viewpoint that does not really sound
very strong. I guess it is not very strong as compared to the previous
301 proposal that was for the House and was watered down at the
request of the Administration to the present 301 definition. I grant
you the argument made by Mr. Barfield and a host of others, that
it appears that you are singling out someone looking like the big,
tough country, demanding that all of these things occur and that it
is going to alienate a variety of countries for no cause; you can do
it in a better way, a different way. Well, that is what the Congress
has been waiting for, that it be done in a different way. How long
must we wait? The House has turned over 50% in the last eight
years. Maybe there is a different way. We are open to suggestions,
but when the Administration comes forth on this issue, they will say,
"If y'all would just balance the budget, that'll solve all the problems."
The next day they will ask for a 10% increase in foreign assistance
and a 15% increase in the defense budget. You can not do all of
these things. By the same token, I understand Smoot-Hawley not
going through an act of the Congress. From the last depression, we
have heard all of that. A lot of people ignore the fact that Smoot-
Hawley was passed eight months after the banks went broke in the
big crash of the 1930's.
Mr. Barfield
Let me ask you this, in talking about the Congress-what would
the Congress do if the EC announced to the United States that they
wanted us to come to the negotiating table and change our current
banking and securities laws so that they would be in compliance with
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EC regulations and further, that we should do it in 3 years or they
will retaliate and every American bank would be excluded from the
European Community? In response to that kind of fiat, I'm sure the
Congress would use some sort of Italian gesture that starts with the
elbow. That is really what I am concerned about. It is not Section
301 per se. I have no problem with the United States going one-on-
one with countries, but we are bound to create problems when we
say they are our rules.
There is one other point to note in terms of what the Congressman
said about our balance of payments. Sooner or later we are going
to have to run trade surpluses with individual countries and individual
regions. The last three or four years witnessed the most free trade
administration that we have had; Reagan was a man with very few
ideas, but free trade was one of them fixed in his mind. In the last
five or six years, we have laid out a primer for other countries to
compete against us when we begin to turn this around and our
corporations and the United States starts running surpluses with other
countries. We should remember that until 1983 we were running
major surpluses with the EC. We are teaching them how to bring
legal actions against our corporations. The largest amount of anti-
dumping really comes against U.S. corporations. Ultimately, anti-
dumping and unfair trade legislation will be used against us when
we are competitive. What worries me is that we have created a primer
for other nations to bring against us when our trade deficit begins
to turn around.
Mr. Sohn
What you are pointing out is a basic rule of international law,
which is what you do to somebody, somebody else may do to you
later. This is a very dangerous position. We have seen it, because
for a while we were the masters of the antitrust proceedings and we
were bringing one foreign corporation after another before our courts.
Then, other countries learned it too, and when the EC started bringing
our corporations before their tribunals, we started screaming and
they simply responded by saying, "but you told us that this can be
done". They were right. Either it is legal or not legal. If it is legal,
everybody can do it; if it is not legal, we should not do it. In these
types of negotiations we must establish the ground rules, for once
you establish the ground rules it is much easier to see who is breaking
them, and that is when the panoply of sanctions can come in.
I was very interested that they have here the basic idea that they
have to establish a variety of principles, rules, concepts and definitions
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because that is where all the legal problems arise. As a result, we
have found out very quickly that trying to define what we are doing
in this particular business puts us in the most difficult position. Even
such a simple thing as "cross-border trade" what does that mean,
if a student is coming to an American university to learn something
which he is going to take home where they might compete with us?
This is cross-border trade in fact. If a tourist comes here and buys
some things and takes them home and then someone says, "Oh, a
very nice thing to copy." Problems immediately start to arise.
Mr. Hunnicutt
Mr. Chairman, I do not want this to become a 301 discussion,
but I have a few reactions and feel like I have settled into a moderate
position here. I just wanted to say that the execution of 301 against
a foreign trade barrier does not require the U.S. position to be that
the foreign government has to adopt the U.S. system of regulation
in that particular area. Our negotiators can be considerably more
sophisticated than that. All they really want from the foreign gov-
ernment is appropriate access and treatment for the U.S. manufac-
turer.
Secondly, the idea that the Reagan Administration was free trade
is so incredible to me that I can hardly accept it, except that you
are probably right that Reagan himself may have been a free trader
(consider it as a point of irony). The point is that we had a 301
provision and an escape clause provision both of which in the early
years of the Reagan Administration and in the Carter Administration
were essentially closed for business. It was only when the Congress
became agitated to the point of threatening the Reagan Administration
with even more drastic action that the Administration was willing to
entertain 301 or 201 actions. At that point they were teaching the
U.S. private sector that the way to get relief in Washington is to
work Congress into a lather and then the Administration will do
what could have been done more easily with a higher degree of
refined thought if they had done it earlier under the provisions which
already existed. That is why provision of an adequate and effective
201 mechanism and reasonable use of a 301 mechanism are ways
that we can address real problems without causing any damage to
the overall structure of the trade system.
Mr. Gakunu
I think we all agree that the main aim of trade liberalization in
the context of the GATT is to benefit all countries, developed and
[Vol. 19:2
TRADE CONFERENCE
developing. But on the many issues that are the subject of this
conference, it appears to me that the majority of the developing
countries are consumers and not producers of services, intellectual
property, and investment. My question is: How would you justify
the participation of these developing countries in the current nego-
tiations in the event that these countries stand to gain little or nothing?
Is it really necessary to bring these matters within the framework of
GATT?
Mr. Cloney
You are right about who is consuming or the balance of trade in
these areas would not be a favorable one for the industrial country
side of the ledger and a deficit on the outgoing side for many
developing countries.
Here, there are a couple of things that need to be explored and
understood more thoroughly than they have been. One is, from the
perspective of the developing country, what is the price you pay if
you are interested in liberalizing trade in services? There are different
developing countries in terms of the economic situation they are in.
Some "developing" countries are well into the economic realm of
some of the lesser "industrial" countries. If you take that group,
one can make a good argument that the rate of economic growth in
that group of developing countries could absorb changes and benefit
if the service sector is modernized. Their economy is probably being
held back by an antiquated service sector while other industry is
being advanced by international assistance and industrialization pres-
sures. I can not prove this statistically, and I do not think it has
been analyzed, but if you took the situation of an economy like the
Brazilian economy, they must be paying a high price for an antiquated,
inefficient and, thus, costly service sector.
The developing countries are going to have to build their service
sectors, and the question to ask is, what is the best way to do that?
Liberalization is one.
Second, a services framework agreement should not provide GATT-
style "special and differential treatment" to the developing countries
as they could simply walk away from real obligations. But properly
structured, an agreement could give some negotiated "time for ac-
commodation", perhaps via certain special types of reservations which
countries could negotiate individually. If the agreement structure itself
is creative, there ought to be some procedure for developing countries
to weave their way into the system by accepting obligations at a
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slower pace, at least in some service sectors, where they feel vul-
nerable.
Mr. Kakabadse
In response to Mr. Gakunu's question, which is a very good one,
I would like to say that after two years, it is fair to say that there
is wide agreement that development of the developing countries is
one of the aims of these negotiations, together with overall economic
growth and expansion of trade in services. There is agreement that
it should be an integral part of an agreement that would emerge and
should not be reflected in waivers and derogations and exceptions.
But what that integral approach should consist of is the practical
question that is now occupying participants. We collectively have to
search for commercial applications of how to make development
more concrete for the developing countries. There is some disagree-
ment about this whole question. There are some who have opposed
the view that liberalization per se facilitates access to competitive
services and facilitates the more efficient allocation of resources in
a country. Many developing countries in the GNS are really looking
for a more direct contribution. In the Montreal Declaration, I would
like to draw your attention to the part where it says that an agreement
should provide developing countries secure access to distribution chan-
nels and information networks. Those are two examples of the things
that developing countries have particularly been asking for in these
negotiations.
The second part of your question is on whether this should be
brought into the GATT. A word of caution here. As I said, the
Uruguay Round is a two-track process, and although the whole thing
is happening under the auspices of the GATT, the negotiations on
services are technically separate from the GATT negotiations on
goods. The question of what would happen to the services agreement
at the end of the round and how it will be incorporated in the total
results, and what the role of the GATT Secretariat may be is unclear.
It is not necessarily the case that if we get a services agreement it is
going to be a GATT agreement. That will have to be decided at the
end of the Round.
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